Decision Register
Regimes ยท EU AI Act

The EU AI Act, as deployer

Attaches to every line through the literacy duty and the listing check; the deployer duties, the logs, the oversight design and the impact assessment attach to the lines that carry an Annex III use; the transparency notice attaches to the lines that face a person.

On the register, tick "EU AI Act (deployer)" and these rows appear on every line the regime reaches. Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689.

Which lines it reaches, and with what

On every classified line

Art. 4. AI literacy attaches to every AI system whatever its class: the people operating this line need a level of literacy calibrated to it.

Art. 5, Art. 6. The named check and the listing mechanism: screen the line against the Art. 5 list before first use, and record whether it is an Annex III use (Art. 6, Annex III).

On lines that carry an Annex III use

Art. 26. The deployer duties on a listed use: use per the instructions, assign human oversight to competent persons, check the input data, monitor, keep the logs, inform workers.

Art. 13, Art. 14. What to demand of the provider on a listed use: the instructions for use with the accuracy and oversight measures stated (Art. 13), and oversight the reviewer can actually exercise (Art. 14).

Art. 12, Art. 19. The logs: the system must generate them (Art. 12) and the deployer keeps them for at least six months under Art. 26; Art. 19, the provider's own retention duty, is quoted so the deployer knows what the provider must be able to show.

On Annex III lines, at the deployers that Art. 27 names

Art. 27 applies where the deployer is a body governed by public law, a private entity providing public services, or deploys the line to evaluate creditworthiness or to price life and health insurance. The fundamental rights impact assessment before first use, for the deployers Art. 27 names.

On lines that decide (with review or alone), carrying an Annex III use

Art. 86. The right to an explanation: a person subject to a decision taken on the output of an Annex III system can ask for the role the system played and the main elements of the decision.

On lines that face a customer or a candidate

Art. 50. Transparency to the person interacting: a customer or a candidate dealing with the system is told so.

The record it expects

informsThe tool produces a summary, a ranking or a flag that a person reads before deciding; the person owns the decision. The record holds: who read the output and what it informed; date and the tool version; the output kept with the decision it informed.
draftsThe tool produces the draft of a document, a figure or a position that a person edits and signs; the person owns the content. The record holds: who edited and who signed; date and the tool version; the draft kept beside the signed version; what was changed, classed as omission, misstatement or wording.
decides with reviewThe tool takes the decision and a named person reviews every case or a stated share before the effect; the reviewer can change the outcome. The record holds: reviewer, role and the competence that qualifies them (Art. 26); date and the tool version; sample reviewed: the count out of the total, and the share; overrides: count and rate; escalations and to whom; log reference and retention period (Art. 12, Art. 26); input data checked as relevant and representative (Art. 26).
decides aloneThe tool takes the decision and the effect follows with no person in between; a person may audit afterwards. The record holds: who audits the line afterwards, role and competence (Art. 26); date, the tool version and the volume decided; audit sample: the count out of the total, and the share; reversals after audit: count and rate; escalations and to whom; log reference and retention period (Art. 12, Art. 26); input data checked as relevant and representative (Art. 26); incidents reported to the provider and the date (Art. 26).

The listing mechanism and the FRIA field list

Article 6 is the classification rule and Annex III the list of use cases it points to; the register renders Annex III as a named reference and reads eleven of its task types as Annex III uses (credit scoring, employment, essential services, insurance pricing). Article 5 is rendered as a named check to run before first use, by its heading and the published text, never as a verdict on a line. Article 27 applies to the deployers it names; for a listed-use line at such a deployer the register lists the items the assessment holds:

  1. The deployer's processes in which the system will be used, in line with its intended purpose
  2. The period of time within which, and the frequency with which, the system is intended to be used
  3. The categories of natural persons and groups likely to be affected by its use in the specific context
  4. The specific risks of harm likely to have an impact on the categories of persons or groups identified, taking into account the information given by the provider under Article 13
  5. A description of the implementation of human oversight measures, according to the instructions for use
  6. The measures to be taken in the case of the materialisation of those risks, including the arrangements for internal governance and complaint mechanisms
  7. The notification of the assessment results to the market surveillance authority (Art. 27(3)), where required

Named reference, not quoted: EU AI Act Annex III, the list of high-risk use cases (a named reference; the listing mechanism is Article 6).

The clauses, quoted

11 of 43 in the framework

Requirement text in our own words, read clause by clause from the published standards: our statement of each clause, not the instrument verbatim.

EU AI Act Art. 4 AI literacy

Providers and deployers of AI systems must take measures to ensure, to their best extent, a sufficient level of AI literacy among their own staff and any other persons who deal with the operation and use of AI systems on their behalf. The measures must be calibrated to those persons' technical knowledge, experience, education and training, to the context in which the AI systems are to be used, and to the persons or groups of persons on whom the systems are to be used. The duty attaches to every AI system regardless of its risk class.

Evidence an auditor accepts: A register of the staff and contracted persons who operate or use AI systems on the organisation's behalf; Training content differentiated by role, prior technical knowledge and the deployment context; Attendance, completion and comprehension records per cohort
Common gap: One generic awareness module issued to everyone regardless of role or technical starting point
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 5 Prohibited AI practices

Prohibits a defined set of AI practices, including subliminal/manipulative techniques causing significant harm, exploitation of vulnerabilities, social scoring by public authorities, predictive policing based solely on profiling, untargeted scraping of facial images, emotion recognition in workplace/education, biometric categorisation inferring sensitive attributes, and real-time remote biometric identification (RBI) in publicly accessible spaces by law enforcement (subject to narrow exceptions).

Evidence an auditor accepts: Pre-deployment screening against the Art.5 prohibition list
Common gap: Treating exceptions as routine basis
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 6 Classification rules for high-risk AI systems

Determine and record, for each AI system, whether it is high-risk. A system is high-risk where it is intended to be used as a safety component of, or is itself, a product covered by the Union harmonisation legislation listed in Annex I and that product must undergo third-party conformity assessment, or where it falls within an Annex III use case. Where the provider concludes that an Annex III system is not high-risk because it performs only a narrow procedural task, improves the result of a previously completed human activity, detects decision patterns without replacing or influencing human assessment, or performs a preparatory task, that assessment must be documented before the system is placed on the market or put into service and produced to authorities on request. A system that performs profiling of natural persons is always high-risk and the derogation is not available to it.

Evidence an auditor accepts: A classification record per AI system naming the Annex I legislation or the Annex III use case considered, and the conclusion reached; The documented Art.6(3) assessment where an Annex III system is judged not high-risk, dated before placing on the market; Evidence the profiling rule was applied, so any system profiling natural persons is classified high-risk regardless of the derogation
Common gap: Classification decided once at design time and never revisited when the intended purpose broadened
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 26 Obligations of deployers of high-risk AI systems

Deployers shall use high-risk AI systems in accordance with the IFU; assign human oversight to appropriately competent natural persons; ensure input data is relevant and sufficiently representative; monitor operation and inform the provider of risks/incidents; retain automatically generated logs for at least 6 months (longer where required); inform workers/representatives where used in the workplace; carry out a DPIA where required under GDPR; and where a deployer is a public authority, register the system in the EU database.

Evidence an auditor accepts: Deployer monitoring records; Logs retained at least 6 months; DPIA where applicable
Common gap: Deployer not following IFU
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 13 Transparency and provision of information to deployers

High-risk AI systems shall be designed and developed in such a way as to ensure that their operation is sufficiently transparent to enable deployers to interpret the output and use it appropriately. Providers shall provide instructions for use including the system's intended purpose, level of accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity, foreseeable misuse, performance characteristics, human oversight measures, hardware/software requirements, lifetime and maintenance/care.

Evidence an auditor accepts: Instructions for use covering the Art.13 content list; Deployer-facing system documentation
Common gap: Generic IFU without the Art.13 content elements
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 14 Human oversight

High-risk AI systems shall be designed and developed in such a way that they can be effectively overseen by natural persons during the period in which they are in use. Oversight measures shall enable persons to understand the relevant capacities and limitations and monitor operation, remain aware of automation bias, correctly interpret the output, decide not to use the output or override or reverse it, intervene in operation, and stop the system.

Evidence an auditor accepts: Human-oversight design (UI, controls, alerts); Oversight-personnel training and authority
Common gap: Oversight is nominal (e.g. cannot stop the system in practice)
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 12 Record-keeping (logs)

High-risk AI systems shall technically allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system, ensuring a level of traceability appropriate to the intended purpose; logging capabilities for biometric remote-identification AI systems include the period of each use, the reference database against which input data has been checked, the input data for which the search led to a match, and the natural persons involved in the verification.

Evidence an auditor accepts: Logging capability design evidence; Log-retention policy aligned with the intended purpose
Common gap: Insufficient logging to reconstruct system operation
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 19 Automatically generated logs

Providers must keep the logs referred to in Art.12(1) that their high-risk AI systems generate automatically, to the extent those logs are under their control. The logs must be kept for a period appropriate to the intended purpose of the system and in any event for at least six months, unless Union or national law provides otherwise, in particular Union law on the protection of personal data. Providers that are financial institutions maintain them within the documentation kept under Union financial services law.

Evidence an auditor accepts: A documented log retention period per system, with the reasoning that ties it to the intended purpose; Evidence the retained period is at least six months, or the Union or national law that displaces it; A record of which logs are under the provider's control and which sit with the deployer, so the boundary is explicit
Common gap: Six months treated as the target rather than the floor, where the intended purpose calls for longer
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 27 Fundamental rights impact assessment for high-risk AI systems

Before deploying a high-risk AI system referred to in Art.6(2) (Annex III), public-law-governed deployers (and certain private deployers providing public services + financial services) shall perform a fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA) describing the deployment context, the categories of affected persons, the specific risks of harm to fundamental rights, the human-oversight measures, and the measures to be taken in case of materialisation of those risks; the deployer shall notify the market surveillance authority of the results.

Evidence an auditor accepts: FRIA per in-scope deployment; Notification to market surveillance authority
Common gap: No FRIA for in-scope deployments
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 86 Right to explanation of individual decision-making

A deployer must, at the request of an affected person who has been subject to a decision the deployer took on the basis of the output of an Annex III high-risk AI system other than one listed under Annex III point 2, and which produces legal effects or similarly significantly affects that person in a way they consider to have an adverse impact on their health, safety or fundamental rights, provide clear and meaningful explanations of the role of the AI system in the decision-making procedure and of the main elements of the decision taken. The duty does not apply where Union or national law provides an exception or restriction, and applies only to the extent the right is not otherwise provided for under Union law.

Evidence an auditor accepts: A documented procedure for receiving and answering explanation requests, with an owner and a response time; Explanation templates per decision type, covering both the role of the AI system in the procedure and the main elements of the decision; A register of requests received and the explanations given
Common gap: No inbound channel at all, so the right exists on paper and cannot be exercised
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689
EU AI Act Art. 50 Transparency obligations for providers and deployers of certain AI systems

Providers and deployers of certain AI systems (incl those interacting with natural persons, emotion recognition, biometric categorisation, generative AI producing synthetic content, deepfakes, and AI-generated/manipulated text for public-interest information) shall inform users that they are interacting with AI, label synthetic content in a machine-readable format, and disclose deepfakes and AI-generated public-interest text (subject to free-expression and artistic exceptions).

Evidence an auditor accepts: User-facing AI-interaction notification; Machine-readable labelling of synthetic content; Deepfake/AI-text disclosure
Common gap: No disclosure that the user is interacting with AI
Source framework: EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689

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